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Introduction
It is well known from economic theory that rent seeking is an important factor in
explaining fishermen’s behaviour in open-access situations. However, in the fisher-
ies economics literature (and particularly in empirical work) the focus has been on
stock and cost effects, and the effect of changes in revenue has received little atten-
tion.1 Some exceptions do exist though. Wilen and Homans (1994) showed that fish-
ermen will respond to changes in the regulatory system by changing their products
in order to obtain higher revenues. Several authors have also shown that the timing
of the harvest can be important, since the quality of the fish, and, therefore, the price
one receives, may change throughout the year (Conrad 1982; Anderson 1989;
Kellogg, Easley, and Johnson 1988; Önal et al., 1991). Larkin and Sylvia (1999)
showed that the regulatory system can be essential for exploiting the opportunities
that seasonal fluctuations in quality give.
Here, we will describe a somewhat different case that we think is of interest,
since it illustrates how responsive fishermen can be to revenue changes in an open-
access fishery, and how increased revenues, thereby, intensify the race to fish. It
also demonstrates the importance of the political game played by fishermen and
regulators, and gives an example of how quota allocation is endogenous in the man-
agement system. The case we look at is the Norwegian coastal fishery for mackerel,
where the fishermen experienced almost a doubling of the price of their catch from
1995 to 1996, while their total quota remained the same.
Background
The total Norwegian catch of mackerel has varied around 150,000 tons annually in
the 1990s, being as high as 260,000 tons in 1994 (see table 1). The coastal mackerel
Frank Asche is a professor at Stavanger University College and Centre for Fisheries Economics, Norwe-
gian School of Economics and Business Administration, P.O. Box 2557, Ullandhaug, N-4091 Stavanger,
Norway, e-mail: Frank.Asche@snf.no. Kristin Aarland is a research assistant at Centre for Fisheries
Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Breiviksveien 40, N5045
Bergen, Norway, e-mail: Kristin.Aarland@snf.no.
The authors wish to thank the Norwegian Research Council for financial support.
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fishery has historically yielded about 20,000 tons per year, increasing to 29,000 tons
in 1998 and 1999. This makes the coastal mackerel fishery a rather small part of the
total Norwegian mackerel fishery, constituting less than 15% of the total landings in
most years. Due to its modest economic significance, it has received little attention
over the years. However, as with all coastal fisheries in Norway, it is important for
political reasons, as coastal fisheries remain a major source of employment in
smaller communities along the coast.
In the mackerel fishery, a coastal vessel is defined as any vessel below 21.35
meters in total length. The vessels use different types of gear, including purse seine,
troll net, and longline, with the former being the most powerful. The coastal mack-
erel fishery has undergone major regulatory changes in recent years. A global TAC
for this fleet segment was not introduced until 1995. In contrast to other fisheries,
the coastal mackerel fishery remained an open-access fishery until quite recently, al-
lowing free entry of new vessels below the maximum length limit.2
The Effect of a Price Increase
Table 2 shows landings, revenue, and average price per kilogram for the coastal
mackerel fishery.
The most important thing to note is that the average price (in NOK) increased
by as much as 78.8% from 1995 to 1996. This is due to changed market conditions
in Japan, which is the main market for Norwegian mackerel, as the Japanese mack-
erel quotas were significantly reduced.
The higher price substantially increased the potential rent in the fishery. Rev-
enue from the fishery increased from 56 million NOK (US$7.2 million) in 1995, to
124 million NOK (US$15.9 million) in 1996, or 121%. The quota, however, stayed
the same, although landings increased by 4,000 tons. Hence, most of the increase in
revenue can be regarded as higher potential rents in the fishery.
Since the coastal fleet’s quota remained at 20,000 tons, one would not expect any
change in effort in a well-managed fishery. However, such a significant price increase
gives strong incentives to expand fishing effort in an open-access fishery. Coupled with
a global TAC, a race for fish is also likely to develop. This is exactly what happened.
2 Open access in Norwegian fisheries still implies that the fishermen have to comply with the Law of
Participation. This states that all fishing vessels are subject to an occupational permit. Such a permit can
be obtained if the owner of the vessel, or the majority share holders in the case of a company, has had
fishing as his main occupation during at least three of the last five years (as of January 1, 2000), down
from at least three of the last ten years previously. The occupational permit is conditional on regional
considerations and the state of the resource base. There is a general exception from the Law of Partici-
pation for vessels below 50 feet (15.68 meters) in total length.
Table 1
Total Mackerel Quotas and Landings and for the Coastal Fleet, 1990–99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a
Total Quota, 1,000 tons 146 177 207 226 248 200 133 133 157 157
Total Catch 1,000 tons 147 180 208 223 260 202 136 137 158 161
Coastal Fleet:
Quota, 1,000 tons 18 20 20 19 19 20 20 20 30 30
Catch, 1,000 tons 16 17 18 15 21 17 21 20 29 29
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Table 3 shows the number of vessels participating in the coastal mackerel fish-
ery by category. The total number of coastal vessels fishing for mackerel increased
from 442 to 693, or by 57%, from 1995 to 1996. In 1997, the number had grown to
765, an additional 10% increase from 1996, even though the price decreased from
1996 to 1997. These numbers also understate the real increase in capacity, as many
new entrants had relatively more powerful vessels, and already participating vessels
were upgraded. Purse seiners larger than 13 meters are the most catch-efficient
coastal vessels. Table 3 shows that the number of vessels in this category increased
by 87% from 1995 to 1996. In the same period, the number of vessels employing
nets and longline increased by 195%, from 19 to 56. Since this is the most common
type of vessel in other coastal fisheries, it is not surprising that this group has the
largest increase in number of vessels, indicating a transfer of fishing power from
other coastal fisheries. However, in pelagic fisheries, the fishing power of these ves-
sels is less than that of the purse seiners. Finally, the number of smaller vessels be-
low 13 meters rose from 368 to 534, or 45%, from 1995 to 1996.
The Political Game
The substantial increase in fishing effort following the price increase was a surprise
to regulators and fishermen’s organizations. However, the actions that followed il-
lustrate fairly well how fisheries management is also very much a political issue.3
Since the price increase made the coastal mackerel fishery much more valuable, the
fishermen’s organizations immediately began lobbying for larger quotas for their re-
spective groups. Coastal fishermen have substantial political clout in Norway. It is,
therefore, not too surprising that the quota for the coastal vessels was increased
from 20,000 tons in 1997 to 30,000 tons in 1998, at the expense of the larger purse
seiners (above 21.35 meters).
Within the coastal group there was also substantial conflict of interest. In par-
ticular, the new coastal purse seiners were regarded as foreign elements within the
coastal group. Many of these vessels were just below the length limit that allowed
them to be defined as coastal vessels and were certainly among the most powerful
vessels of the fleet. In 1997, a license based on former participation was introduced
for purse seiners between 13 and 21.35 meters in total length, restricting access to
3 This illustrates one way of endogenous quota setting in management systems. That quotas are endog-
enous in the system is also discussed in various forms by Johnson (1995) and Homans and Wilen (1997).
Table 2
Catch, Revenues, and Price per Kilo for the Coastal Fleet, 1990–99. Real Values (1999=1)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a
Catch, 1,000 tons 16 17 18 15 21 17 21 20 29 29
Value, mill NOK 55 54 45 38 53 56 124 97 134 130
Average price NOK/kg 3.40 3.25 2.54 2.44 2.58 3.26 5.83 4.84 4.58 4.44
Exchange Rate USD/NOKb 6.26 6.48 6.21 7.09 7.06 6.34 6.46 7.07 7.54 7.82
Value, mill USD 8.5 8.0 6.9 5.1 7.2 8.5 18.4 13.2 17.4 16.6
Average price USD/kg 0.52 0.48 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.49 0.86 0.65 0.59 0.57
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries
a Preliminary numbers.
b An annual average exchange rate based on monthly exchange rates from the Central Bank of Norway
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the coastal fishery. Although the final decree was less excluding than the original
proposal from the Fisheries Director, the closure effectively barred further entrance
into this fleet segment. Moreover, the coastal fleet’s quota was divided into two
shares—one for purse seiners above 13 meters, and one for the remaining coastal
vessels. In 1997, the split was even, allocating 10,000 tons to each segment, while in
1998, the purse seiners above 13 meters got 17,500 tons out of a total quota of
30,000 tons. In 1999, the split was again even with 15,000 tons allotted to each
group. This should be seen in contrast to the years before this arrangement, when
purse seiners above 13 meters accounted for between 63% and 86% of the coastal
mackerel landings.
The restricted access to the coastal purse seine fishery may also have triggered
an increase in the number of larger conventional vessels, which increased from 19 in
1995 to 70 in 1997. In 1998, restricted access, based on former participation, was
introduced also for vessels between 13 and 21.35 meters employing net or longline.
Still, the number of such vessels participating in the coastal mackerel fishery in-
creased further to 91 in 1998. This may be explained by the fact that fishermen
wanted to ensure their right to participate in the mackerel fishery in the future, as
this right is conditional on the fishermen’s mackerel landings in certain base years,
which are decided upon annually.
It is also interesting to note that the rent seems to have been fully dissipated al-
ready in 1998 even with the higher quota, as the number of vessels in all classes was
reduced in 1999.
Concluding Remarks
It has been shown how potential profits caused by a large price increase led to a sub-
stantial increase of effort in the Norwegian coastal mackerel fishery. Since quotas
were initially not raised for this group, this case also provides a good example of
how quickly rent can be dissipated when capacity is available from other fisheries,
and, therefore, how valuable good management can be. Moreover, the increased rev-
enue from the fishery also illustrates how important politics might be in managing a
Table 3
Catch and Participation in the Coastal Mackerel Fishery by Vessel Category, 1993–99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 a
Total catch (tons) 18,000 23,000 20,000 23,000 20,000 29,000 29,000
Total No. of vessels 515 553 442 693 765 763 662
Purse seine 13–21.35 m
No. of vessels 48 54 55 103 89b 89b 80b
Catch 15,060 19,842 15,882 14,616 10,112 15,500 14,600
Net/line 13–21.35 m
No. of vessels 32 26 19 56 70 91b 76b
Catch 459 1,249 1,186 1,860 3,387 4,900 4,700
All vessels < 13 m
No. of vessels 435 473 368 534 606 642 546
Catch 2,376 2,311 3,033 6,309 7,056 8,600 9,900
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries
a Preliminary numbers.
b Limited entry scheme introduced.Thalassorama 71
fishery, particularly when it comes to distributive issues. In our example, small-
scale fishermen succeeded both in winning quota shares from other fleet segments,
as well as limiting access for the larger vessels within the coastal group.
References
Anderson, L.G. 1989. Optimal Intra- and Interseasonal Harvesting Strategies when Price Var-
ies with Individual Size. Marine Resource Economics 6(2):145–62.
Conrad, J.M. 1982. Management of a Multiple Cohort Fishery: The Hard Clam in Great
South Bay. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(3):92–106.
Homans, F.R., and J.E. Wilen. 1997. A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use. Jour-
nal of Environmental Economics and Management 32(1):1–21.
Johnson, R.N. 1995. Implications of Taxing Quota Value in an Individual Transferable Quota
Fishery. Marine Resource Economics 10(4):327–40.
Kellogg, R.L., J.E. Easley, Jr., and T. Johnson. 1988. Optimal Timing of Harvest for the
North Carolina Bay Scallop Fishery. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
70(1):50–61.
Larkin, S.L., and G. Sylvia. 1999. Intrinsic Fish Characteristics and Intraseason Production
Efficiency: A Management-Level Bioeconomic Analysis of a Commercial Fishery.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(1):29–43.
Munro, G.R., and A.D. Scott. 1985. The Economics of Fisheries Management. Handbook of
Natural Resource and Energy Economics, vol. II, A.V. Kneese and J.L. Sweeny, eds.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. 1999. Personal communication.
Önal, H., B.A. McCarl, W.L. Griffin, G. Matlock, and J. Clark. 1991. A Bioeconomic Analy-
sis of the Texas Shrimp Fishery and its Optimal Management. American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics 73(4):1161–170.
Wilen, J.E., and F.R. Homans. 1994. Marketing Losses in Regulated Open Access Fisheries.
Fisheries Economics and Trade: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference, J. Catanzano, ed.
Paris: IFREMER-SEM.